American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2011

Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency Cooperation
Jayesh Rathod

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

PROTECTING IMMIGRANT WORKERS
THROUGH INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

Jayesh M. Rathod*

INTRODUCTION
Stephen Lee's Monitoring Immigration Enforcement' offers a promising

prescription for resolving the long-standing tension between the workplace
enforcement priorities of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and the
efforts by the Department of Labor ("DOL") to protect the rights of immigrant
workers. Lee convincingly describes-often with the aid of rich historical
examples-the origins of the chronic imbalance of power between DHS and the
DOL, and the limitations of past efforts to synchronize the work of the respective
agencies. Lee's proposal for interagency coordination, in the form of ex ante
monitoring by the DOL of worksite enforcement decisions, is a novel contribution
to existing writings on immigrants and workplace regulation. Indeed, in the current
political and historic moment, when immigration enforcement is often equated
with the preservation of national security, any proposal to constrain the authority
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is bound to generate debate.
In this Response Essay, my objective is not to critique the core proposal
that Lee advances, as I agree in principle with the concept of ex ante agency
monitoring and believe that the DOL and DHS are well positioned to adopt such a
framework. Rather, I seek to build on Lee's article with reflections on the
following four themes: (1) the complexity of the regulatory environment in which
any interagency monitoring would take place, and the inevitable politicization of
regulatory bodies; (2) the broader social and political context of immigration and
labor regulation, and how that might shape collaborations between the DOL and
DHS; (3) the precise circumstances under which the DOL might exercise its
authority to constrain worksite enforcement actions; and (4) the significance of
policy initiatives-relating to the intersection of workers' rights and immigration
enforcement-that have emerged during the administration of President Barack
Obama.
*
Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of
Law. Thanks to Stephen Lee for penning his valuable addition to the literature on
immigrants in the workplace and for inviting me to offer a response. Thanks also to
Elizabeth Keyes for her comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1.
Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARiZ. L. REv. 1089
(2011).
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ENFORCING LABOR STANDARDS:

MULTIPLE ACTORS IN A TURBULENT POLITICAL SEA
In his article, Lee rightly criticizes the lack of influence by the DOL over
the workplace enforcement decisions made by DHS. Building in some kind of ex
ante constraint on ICE actions will certainly benefit a number of workers engaged
in labor disputes. To realize its full potential, however, Lee's proposal would have
to be expanded to include state and local entities that enforce labor standards, as
well as federal agencies outside of the DOL. 2 Additionally, to ensure the long-term
sustainability of any interagency monitoring framework, one must plan for
scenarios in which federal or state workplace agencies become politicized and
stray from the core mission of enforcing labor standards.
In the current regulatory environment, scores of entities apart from the
DOL are charged with enforcing labor standards. These include state-level
equivalents of the DOL, as well as agencies or commissions at the county or
municipal level. Indeed, following the passage of landmark federal labor and
employment laws throughout the 20th century, parallel statutes often emerged at
the state and local levels. For example, many states have adopted analogs to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") in the form of state minimum wage,
overtime, and wage payment and collection laws. 3 Although some of these laws
simply incorporate the FLSA by reference, others establish independent, more
stringent standards and are enforced by state entities that are largely independent
of the DOL.4
In light of this broad constellation of enforcement agencies, Lee's vision
would optimally be expanded to cover workplace disputes handled by all agencies,
not just the DOL. Although the DOL has a network of regional offices that receive

2.
The importance of these related entities is reflected in Immigration and
Naturalization Service Operations Instruction 287.3a. Therefore, it is fitting that they be
incorporated into any affirmative oversight authority that the DOL might enjoy.
3.
For example, all U.S. states, with the exception of Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee, have some form of minimum wage law. See
Minimum Wage Laws in the States - January 1, 2011, WAGE & HOUR Div., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last updated June 2011). Notably,
several states attempted to enact minimum wage laws before the passage of the FLSA, but
some were struck down as unlawful incursions on the employer's ability to negotiate wage
rates with their employees. See William P. Quigley, "A FairDay's Pay for a Fair Day's
Work": Time to Raise and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 513, 516-29
(1996) (describing the history of state and federal minimum wage legislation in the United
States).
4.
In the wage and hour context, the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour
Division may have overlapping jurisdiction with a state agency if a given factual situation
gives rise to violations of both the FLSA and state law. Where state law provides for a
higher hourly wage, or more stringent payment requirements, enforcement of those
standards would rest with the state. The Wage and Hour Division is focused on the
enforcement of federal statutes, including the FLSA, Family and Medical Leave Act,
Davis-Bacon Act, Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, and others.
Major Laws Administered/Enforced, WAGE & HOUR Div., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/statutes/summary.htm (last visited July 15, 2011).

IMMIGRANT WORKERS

20111

1159

complaints, workers and their advocates may simply prefer to use a state agency to
resolve labor disputes. This preference may be driven by geographic convenience,
familiarity with local processes and personnel, or broader statutory jurisdiction at
the state level. 5 Some recent statistics from the wage and hour context underscore
the relative size of federal and state enforcement efforts. In fiscal year 2008, at the
federal level, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL collected over $185 million
on behalf of 228,645 workers. 6 Meanwhile, in 2009, a single state agency, the New7
York Department of Labor, recovered $28.8 million on behalf of 18,000 workers.
If, per Lee's proposal, the DOL is given ex ante authority to constrain ICE actions
when a labor dispute is pending, the framework must envisage disputes registered
at the state level. This may require the DOL to maintain closer links with its statelevel partners, and even coordinate records and databases. 8 Indeed, a
"clearinghouse" role for the DOL may be inevitable; any kind of direct monitoring
arrangement between a state-level labor department and DHS seems politically
unfeasible and constitutionally problematic.
In a similar fashion, Lee's proposal might integrate federal agencies
outside of the DOL that commonly receive complaints from immigrant workers.
For example, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has grappled with
issues relating to immigrant workers. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, which limited the remedies available to

undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations Act, 9 has prompted the
NLRB to issue a series of memoranda emphasizing that undocumented persons
continue to benefit from most (if not all) of the law's protections. 10 Historically,
the shadow of a labor dispute involving the NLRB has been insufficient to forestall
deportation proceedings." For this reason, and also as a mild palliative for the
limitations imposed by Hoffman, inclusion of the NLRB in an ex ante monitoring
framework would be critical.

5.

Per the FLSA, state agencies are authorized to assist with the enforcement of

the statute, and may even be reimbursed by the DOL for that purpose. 29 U.S.C. § 211 (b)
(2006).
6.
2008 Statistics Fact Sheet, WAGE & HOUR DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Dec.
2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.htm.
7.
Press Release, N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, Governor Paterson Announces
Record Level of Recovered Wages Returned to New Yorkers in 2009 (Dec. 31, 2009),
availableat http://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2009/December3 l_2009.htm.
8.
A coordinated database of this type would not only aid the project of
interagency monitoring; it would also enhance the core work of the DOL itself. With access
to empirical data about complaints against employers, the DOL might begin to shift a
largely reactive enforcement program into a proactive program driven by data trends

relating to specific employers, industries, and geographic areas.
9.

10.

535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).

Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Labor

Relations Bd. (July 19, 2002), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/
emprights/Memo GC 02-06.pdf, Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.ilw.com
immigrationdaily/news/2011,0609-nlrb.pdf.
11.
Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1997) (permitting deportation

based on evidence obtained in connection with a labor dispute).
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Similarly, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") receives thousands of employment discrimination complaints each year
from immigrant workers. One subset of these complaints are those alleging2
charges.'
national origin discrimination; in 2010, the EEOC received 11,304 such
Accordingly, any efforts to reconcile workplace disputes and immigration
enforcement would ideally integrate claims brought before the EEOC. One way to
ensure that disputes before the NLRB and the EEOC are brought within the fold is
to deepen interagency agreements between federal entities with an interest in
protecting immigrant workers. 13 In short, Lee's proposed framework should be
expanded both vertically (to involve state agencies) and horizontally (to integrate
parallel federal bodies).
The proposed interagency monitoring agreement must also consider the
political winds that might dampen the DOL's enthusiasm to embrace an ex ante
oversight role. Unlike some agencies, where bureaucratization has solidified
certain core operations, the posture of the DOL has varied dramatically depending
on the administration in power. For example, during the George W. Bush
administration, the federal government was largely silent about the 1998
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the DOL and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS"), with advocates questioning its ongoing
applicability. 14 During the Bush administration, the DOL scaled back its
enforcement activities. 15 Within some DOL subagencies, voluntary compliance

National Origin-Based Charges, FY 1997 - FY 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
(last
COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/origin.cfm
visited July 15, 2011). "National origin" has been interpreted broadly, so a portion of these
charges may have been filed by U.S. citizens. See Compliance Manual Section 13: National
Origin Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Dec. 2, 2002),
(clarifying that national origin
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html
discrimination includes disparate treatment based on ethnicity, physical, linguistic, or
cultural traits, or perceived ethnicity or attributes). At the same time, noncitizen workers
have undoubtedly filed EEOC charges alleging sex discrimination, race discrimination, or
violations of another protected category. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n, Oregon Tree Farm Settles EEOC Lawsuit over Sexual Harassment
and Retaliation (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ecoc/newsroom/release/
4-21-11.cfln (announcing a settlement in a sexual harassment suit brought on behalf of
Latina immigrant farmworkers, and noting "the abundance of sexual harassment cases
involving immigrant workers"). Additionally, although undocumented workers lacking
employment authorization are not likely to advance discrimination claims alleging failure to
hire, such workers might certainly have valid claims stemming from other types of adverse
action.
For example, the EEOC has entered into several memoranda of
13.
understanding with other federal agencies, particularly in areas of overlapping jurisdiction.
See Memoranda of Understanding, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/coordination/mou.html (last modified Sept. 1, 2004).
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and
14.
Naturalization Serv., Dep't of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep't of
Labor (Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/emprights/
MOU.pdf.
15.
DAVID MADLAND & KARLA WALTER, ENFORCING CHANGE: FIVE STRATEGIES
12.

OPPORTUNITY

FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO ENFORCE WORKERS' RIGHTS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
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programs began to replace the traditional enforcement protocols. 16 Ideally, any
interagency monitoring agreement would be insulated from the political whims of
appointees who might choose to let their oversight authority languish. This could
be accomplished through the creation of an external advisory committee or by
requiring periodic reports-from the DOL and DHS-that assess the effectiveness
of the agreement.
The enforcement of labor rights could become just as politicized at the
state level. In his article, Lee warns of the complications engendered by the
enforcement of immigration laws by state and local authorities.' 7 Noncitizens with
pending workplace complaints may be apprehended in jurisdictions participating
in the 287(g) program or could be subjected to an ICE detainer pursuant to the
Secure Communities program.1 8 As Lee notes, these noncitizens may land in ICE
custody, and ICE may have minimal knowledge of the circumstances that led to
the initial arrest.1 9 Add to this mix yet another factor: a politicized state-level labor
agency that is dismissive of the concerns of immigrants, or at worst, complicit in
efforts to intimidate or silence workers. Although the latter scenario has not yet
come to pass, the delegation of immigration enforcement authority, combined with
similar delegations of labor enforcement authority, could create
a perfect storm in
20
a locality where anti-immigrant sentiment has reached its apex.
For example, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, states may
submit a plan to OSHA asking for a delegation of authority to regulate safety and
health matters within their jurisdiction.2 The states must demonstrate that their
own safety standards "are or will be at least as effective in providing safe and
healthful employment and places of employment as the [federal] standards" and
LABOR 7, 15 (2008), available at http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2008/
pdf/dol.pdf (noting that the DOL under Bush "has not used penalties to its full authority"
and that "the number of WHD investigators per 1 million working Americans has dropped
by 27 percent" since Bush took office).
16.
Id. (describing the shift to compliance assistance programs at the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")).
17.
Lee, supra note 1,at 1132-36.
18.
See id. at 1133 n.174 (providing an overview of the Secure Communities
program).
19.
Id. at 1132-33.
20.
Recent events in Hershey, Pennsylvania, demonstrate how local law
enforcement officials can easily become involved in efforts to silence immigrant workers.
In May and June 2011, hundreds of foreign students traveled to the United States on J-1
visas as part of an international exchange program that allows short-term employment and
the opportunity to experience U.S. culture. The students were placed in jobs packing
chocolates at a Hershey Company distribution center in Palmyra, Pennsylvania; soon after
their arrival, they realized that the living and working conditions were not what they had
been promised.

COLLEEN P. BRESLIN ET AL., REPORT OF THE AUGUST

2011 HUMAN

RIGHTS

DELEGATION TO HERSHEY, PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2011), available at http://www.brandeis.edn/
ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/Hersheys.pdf On August 17, 2011, the students staged a sitin protest at the distribution center. Id. at 2. In response, an arguably "disproportionate"
number of local law enforcement officers arrived on the scene. Id. at 21. In the experience
of one labor leader, "the level of coordination between law enforcement and management
was highly unusual for situations involving local labor disputes." Id.
21.
29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2006).

1162

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:1157

must meet certain other requirements. 22 To date, 27 states and territories have
approved OSHA state plans. In recent years, the DOL itself has expressed
concern about the deterioration of occupational health and safety protections in
some state-plan jurisdictions. 24 In such circumstances, local officials might be
deferential to employers, and perhaps even dismissive of worker complaints.
Absent meaningful labor protections, unrestrained local immigration enforcement
could further imperil immigrant workers, and worker grievances would go
undetected under any type of monitoring framework.

II.

THE UNSTEADY PARITY OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND
PROTECTION OF LABOR STANDARDS

Despite the tensions between immigration enforcement and the protection
of labor standards, it is reasonable to assume some level of parity between DHS
and the DOL, as both are federal agencies with cabinet-level secretaries and
responsibility for regulating the workplace. 25 I would suggest, however, that the
9/11 terrorist attacks have tacitly positioned homeland security and immigration
enforcement as a superior priority-if not by operation of law, then certainly
through official pronouncements and public discourse.26 Over the last decade,
immigration enforcement has been equated with the protection of national security.
This trend has been reflected in, inter alia, government efforts to expel those

22.
23.

Id. § 667(c)(2).

State Occupational Safety and Health Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html (last
visited July 15, 2011). Of these, five cover only public-sector employees. Id.
24.
See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
REVIEW OF THE NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM, at ii-iii (2009),
available at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/final-nevada-report.pdf (documenting a range of
serious concerns with the Nevada state plan).
25.
Lee, supra note 1, at 1095 ("[I]n theory, ICE and the DOL are empowered to
jointly regulate the workplace on relatively equal terms .... ).
26.
See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement to All ICE Emps. (Mar. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/11O302washingtondc.pdf ("ICE is charged
with enforcing the nation's civil immigration laws. This is a critical mission and one with
direct significance for our national security, public safety, and the integrity of our border
and
immigration
controls.");
Issues: Homeland Security, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security (last visited July 15, 2011) ("The
President's highest priority is to keep the American people safe .... The President is
committed to securing the homeland against 21st century threats by preventing terrorist
attacks and other threats against our homeland, preparing and planning for emergencies, and
investing in strong response and recovery capabilities.").
HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
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noncitizens who pose a security threat. 27 And, as homeland security has risen in
importance, the primacy of other rights has been contested.28
In some ways, the tension between DHS and the DOL is reminiscent of
the dichotomy in the international human rights law framework between civil and
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights on the
other. Violations of civil and political rights are typically perceived as serious,
whereas economic and social rights violations are often tolerated or met with
ambivalence. 29 The 9/11 attacks have arguably led to a psychological retrenchment
of this distinction among rights. Although no one has explicitly called for the
suspension of labor standards in the name of national security, the prioritization of
immigration enforcement plays out in subtle ways. In legislative debates relating to
immigration reform, for example, legislators routinely emphasize the importance
of "securing the borders" before any other measures are implemented. 0 Likewise,
legislation relating to immigration enforcement and national security often passes
with minimal scrutiny, whereas other bills, such as those relating to social or
economic matters, engender much more vigorous opposition. Given these
conditions, any efforts at interagency cooperation must confront the implicit
challenge to agency parity in a post-9/1 environment.
Some might argue that the discourses that link immigration enforcement
with national security are primarily concerned with securing the borders,
regulating entry and exit, and expelling criminal or terrorist elements. According
to this view, worksite enforcement is seen as an independent sphere of oversight,
driven more by economic concerns as opposed to national security imperatives.
While this is partly true, I fear that the two narratives-namely, "national security
threat" and "undocumented worker"-are beginning to merge. For example, in
discussing worksite enforcement post-9/1 1, ICE officials have touted their
27.
For example, on the heels of 9/11, Congress expanded the terrorism-related
inadmissibility grounds in the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411 (a), 115 Stat, 272, 34548 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006)).
See, e.g., Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil
28.
Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 175, 238 (2003) (suggesting that the federal government
has, indeed, struck the right balance between national security and civil liberties, arguing
that "it becomes very difficult to preserve civil liberties if the survival of the nation is in the
balance"); Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 283, 284 (2006) (arguing that "labor's freedom of association, like other
civil liberties, is under stress in the post-9/1 1 period").
29.
Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key
Features of Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 81, 82-

83 (1998). Notwithstanding this divide, scholars and human rights advocates have
continually emphasized the indivisibility of all human rights. Id. at 81-82.
Devin Dwyer, Immigration Debate: How Secure Is Secure Enough at
30.
Border?, ABCNEWS.COM (June 24, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/immigrationreform-secure-border-prerequisite-reform-bill/story?id= 11002367 ('" Secure the border first'
has become a common refrain among lawmakers from both parties, particularly those
representing southwestern states, when asked whether they'd support a comprehensive
immigration reform bill.").

1164

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:1157

apprehension of "unauthorized workers at critical infrastructure facilities,
including highly sensitive sites such as nuclear power plants, major international
airports, seaports, and military facilities.",3' The rollout of electronic employment
verification in the form of E-Verify, and discussions of a national biometric ID
card, are evidence of the growing concerns about securing U.S. workplaces.
Indeed, post-9/11 fears and xenophobia, along with the broader economic
decline, have created challenging conditions for immigrants. These conditions,
while pushing some undocumented persons deeper into the shadows, have
emboldened others to speak out against the injustices they experience. Lee writes
eloquently of how ICE activity can lead immigrants to distrust government
generally, thereby undermining the work of the DOL, which relies heavily on
worker complaints. 32 That immigrants-especially undocumented immigrantswould tend to avoid interactions with the government is a sound proposition.
Nevertheless, in our discourse about agency action and immigrant behavior, we
must also contemplate undocumented persons who knowingly engage with
government agencies, notwithstanding the possible repercussions.33 Otherwise, we
risk doing a dignitary
disservice to immigrants, whose behavior often defies easy
34
categorization.

I1. DEVELOPING AN Ex ANTE MONITORING FRAMEWORK
Lee's article effectively describes the purpose and broad contours of an
interagency monitoring agreement between the DOL and ICE relating to worksite
enforcement. One type of arrangement that Lee describes involves "requir[ing]
ICE to obtain permission from the DOL before investigating a particular
workplace." 35 Lee's intriguing proposal invites additional thinking about exactly
how such an arrangement would be structured. Below, I share a few initial queries
and offer further content to Lee's proposal.

31.
Prioritiesin EnforcingImmigration Laws and Temporary Worker Program:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on Appropriations,

109th Cong. 57 (2006) (statement of Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement). Some of these arrests have occurred in the context of specific
initiatives. For example, after 9/11, federal officials launched Operation Tarmac, an

initiative designed to identify unauthorized workers at U.S. airports. See, e.g., Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivar, Airport Worker Arrests Assailed as Too Sweeping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2002, at A 12 (describing mixed opinions about the effectiveness of Operation Tarmac).
32.
Lee, supra note 1, at 1100-04.
33.
In recent years, in the face of heightened immigration enforcement and the
lack of meaningful immigration reform, undocumented persons have been increasingly
willing to speak openly about their status, speak out against government (in)action, and

participate in public campaigns. See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, Several Arrested in Immigration
Protests, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-metsecure-communities-protest-20110818,0,5850145. story (describing a Chicago protest
against the Secure Communities initiative, at which protesters chanted "undocumented and
unafraid").
34.
Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the Chilling Effect: Immigrant Worker Behavior
and the Regulation of OccupationalSafety & Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 267,
292 (2010).
35.
Lee, supra note 1, at 1125.
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Let me begin with a few threshold questions. First, when exercised, what
exactly would the DOL "pre-clearance power" look like? Would the DOL be able
to prevent ICE enforcement actions from taking place? Or would the DOL's
interests simply mean that ICE enforcement actions will be delayed for a fixed
period of time? Second, what type of circumstance flagged by the DOL would be
sufficient to chill action by ICE? Would a single complaint brought by an
individual worker suffice? Would the complaint have to be brought by a worker or
workers who are being targeted by ICE in the enforcement action? (And would
such information be knowable in most cases?) Or, would the DOL speak with
more authority vis-d-vis ICE if the employer had already been found to have
violated certain workplace laws?
I suggest, as a way to address these complexities, that any interagency
agreement be structured as a "sliding scale," where the weight of the DOL
oversight would be proportionate to: (1) the gravity of the employer's prior record
of workplace rights violations; (2) the certainty of that record (e.g., whether the
record contains mere allegations or formal findings of fault); (3) the degree to
which former or current complainants might be affected by the enforcement
action; and (4) the number of workers involved in prior complaints. 36 This can be
illustrated visually as follows:

DOL

CONCERNS
(ADDITIVE)

Complaints

Moratoriumon

EFFECT ON ICE

directly
affected by

enforcement
action at given

ENFORCEMENT
ACTION

ICE action

worksite(s)

Serious record
ofprior

violations
Pending complaints
involving multiple

Longer delay of
enforcement
action

workers
Single pending
complaint

Short delay of
Multiple past
complaints

enforcement action

Single past

complaint

No effect

36.
There is one drawback to including this last criterion: Complaints emanating
from smaller workplaces-for example, a complaint lodged by a single domestic workermight appear too tenuous to justify restraint over ICE action. The ex ante monitoring
framework must operate in a way that does not systematically disadvantage such workers.
As suggested below, case-by-case consideration could help ameliorate this concern.
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The DOL concerns listed above are not intended to correlate directly to a
specific outcome. Rather, they represent a range of concerns, with the outcome to
be determined on a case-by-case basis-perhaps by an interagency working group.
Although this framework does not capture the full continuum of scenarios, it
would allow some flexibility, given the challenges involved in such a partnership.
If, as I suggest above, the DOL lacks some political capital as compared with
DHS, a flexible framework would allow the DOL to take a stronger stand when the
stakes for immigrant workers are highest.

IV. SOME REFLECTIONS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the months prior to this publication, DHS and the DOL issued
memoranda relating to the role of the respective agencies in worksite enforcement
and labor disputes. These documents reflect, in part, the core concerns raised by
Lee. At the same time, they suggest the dawn of a new approach to worksite
enforcement-or at a minimum, a greater coherence in the missions of the two
agencies.
Lee appropriately critiques the limited utility of the 1998 Memorandum
of Understanding between the DOL and the INS, a predecessor agency of DHS. 37
On March 31, 2011, the DOL and DHS issued a revised MOU concerning
enforcement activities at worksites.3 8 The stated purpose of the 2011 MOU is "to
set forth the ways in which the Departments will work together to ensure that their
respective civil worksite enforcement activities do not conflict and to advance the
mission of each Department., 39 Importantly, ICE agreed to "refrain from engaging
in civil worksite enforcement activities at a worksite that is the subject of an
existing DOL investigation of a labor dispute during the pendency of the DOL
investigation and any related proceeding." 40 To that end, the MOU commits the
information to allow for
DOL to "providing ICE with timely and accurate
41
identification of overlapping enforcement activity."
The language of the Memorandum suggests an evolving vision of ICE's
role in workplace regulation. Unlike the 1998 MOU, which was phrased in more
neutral terms, the 2011 MOU acknowledges the possibility of conflicts in the work
of the two agencies. Additionally, the 2011 MOU contains provisions that are
specifically designed to address past practices that have harmed vulnerable
immigrant workers. For example, the new MOU commits ICE to properly screen
tips to ensure that the agency is not complicit in efforts to retaliate against
workers. 42 Another provision forbids ICE from misrepresenting itself as the DOL,

37.
Lee, supra note 1, at 1121.
Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep't of Homeland
38.
Sec. and U.S. Dep't of Labor (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 MOU], available
at http://www.dol.gov/ sec/media/reports/hispaniclaborforce/dhs-dol-mou.pdf. The 2011
MOU "voids and supersedes" the 1998 document. Id.at 4.
Id. at 1.
39.
40.
Id. at 2. ICE also carved out circumstances under which an enforcement
at 2-3.
action would move forward, notwithstanding the general agreement to refrain. Id.
Id.
at2.
41.
42.
Id.
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which
Goldsboro, North Carolina, sting ill
hearkening to the concerns raised by the 43
ICE agents masqueraded as OSHA staff.
Although viewed as an important development, the new MOU does not
fully embrace all aspects of Lee's vision. First, it is unclear from the language of
the MOU whether the DOL will be able to affirmatively invoke an ex ante
constraint, or whether DHS will continue to make its own decisions but with
additional information from the DOL. An additional limitation of the MOU is the
temporary nature of ICE's abstention from action. According to the MOU, ICE
would be free to initiate proceedings against an undocumented worker after the
conclusion of a labor dispute. 4 Suppose, for example, that a group of
undocumented workers are able to resolve a wage-claim dispute following
intervention from the DOL. If ICE conducts an enforcement action just weeks or
months later, Lee's concerns about mistrust of government would still be
implicated.
A second development is a memorandum on prosecutorial discretion
issued on June 17, 2011 by John Morton, the Director of ICE.45 The Memorandum
describes a range of circumstances under which attorneys for ICE-the attorneys
that prosecute immigration removal cases-are encouraged to exercise
prosecutorial discretion. Among the categories of individuals who deserve
"[p]articular attention" are "individuals engaging in a protected activity related to
civil or other rights (for example, union organizing or complaining to authorities
about employment discrimination... ) who may be in a non-frivolous dispute with
an employer. '' 46 According to the Memorandum, the discretion can take many
different forms-everything from refusing to issue a Notice to Appear (an
immigration charging document), to temporarily closing the case, to terminating
the removal proceedings.47
Lee appropriately flags the tendency to define agency success in terms of
quantifiable results. 48 In this vein, ICE has been criticized for being numbersdriven, and for defining success by how many noncitizens have been apprehended.
This type of numbers-driven culture may stand in the way of achieving less
tangible goals, such as promoting a safe and healthy workplace where rights are
respected. The Morton Memorandum highlights an opportunity to play to the same
numbers-driven culture a few steps downstream in the process of apprehension and
removal by DHS. ICE attorneys are notoriously overburdened; to the extent that
43.
See id at 3; see also Steven Greenhouse, Immigration Sling Puts Two
FederalAgenciesat Odds, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at A11.

44.
2011 MOU, supra note 38, at 2.
45.
Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-c4ornmuities/
pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
ld. at 2. A successful lawsuit brought by the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
46.
Organization at Yale Law School drove this policy change. Inthat matter, attorneys
persuaded ICE to allow a plaintiff to remain in the United States to pursue a civil rights
lawsuit. See Mark Spencer, Lawsuit Spurs New Deportation Policy, HARTFORD COURAN'T,
July 3, 2011, at B3.
47.
Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 45, at 2.
Lee, supra note 1, at 1116.
48.
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"cases closed" is an important metric for ICE attorneys, the Morton Memorandum
may provide an opportunity to serve the interests of both ICE and the DOL. It also
creates the possibility for a lasting reprieve rather than the temporary hold
contemplated by the MOU.
Finally, the August 2011 announcement from the White House regarding
immigration enforcement priorities is likely-over the long term-to have a
neutralizing effect on worksite enforcement actions. In the announcement, the
White House indicated the federal government's intent to review all pending
removal cases, and to "clear out low-priority cases on a case-by-case basis and
make more room to deport people who have been convicted of crimes or pose a
security risk."' 49 Certainly, many key details about this policy shift remain unclear.
Nevertheless, any sustained effort to insulate certain undocumented persons from
removal proceedings must be accompanied by a shift in the enforcement efforts
that place the undocumented persons in those proceedings. And even if ICE
enforcement culture is resistant to change, the announcement will enhance the
DOL's persuasive power over DHS, should the DOL be given an ex ante
monitoring role.

49.
Cecilia Mufioz, Immigration Update: Maximizing Public Safety and
Better Focusing Resources, WHITE
HOUSE
BLOG
(Aug.
18,
2011,
2:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizingpublic-safety-and-better-focusing-resources.

